Conflict is driving food crises and is a factor in almost all of the world’s hunger emergencies. While the link between violence and food insecurity is well-understood, policy analysts have less frequently studied the fact that war-displacement-hunger crises occur in countries that continue to rely heavily on primary product exports, such as food, agriculture, and extractive industry commodities. A new Oxfam paper examines these “food wars.”
In 2023, crisis-level hunger reached an all-time high, with conflict as a key driver. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons—uprooted most often by conflict—likewise hit a record level of 117.3 million, with 77% of them in countries affected by hunger crises.
Almost all of the violent conflicts that the world witnessed in 2023 and so far this year are what we call “food wars,” in which combatants manipulate food and hunger as weapons, and damage food and food-related water and energy infrastructure, whether intentionally or as a bi-product of the fighting. Frequently, hunger, can in turn trigger conflict when desperate people perceive no other options for livelihoods and survival.
Active conflict also directly interferes with food supply chains, nutrition, and essential health care related to nutrition and indirectly leads to food insecurity among the people forcibly displaced by it. All too often, these unstable conditions spill over and affect those hosting refugees and living in surrounding areas.
Even after wars officially cease, food insecurity often persists. If the injustices and inequalities that served as root causes of earlier fighting are not effectively addressed, discontent sows the seeds of renewed violence, as seen for example in Mozambique, where fighting has resumed after years of relative peace. This legacy of conflicts disrupts social institutions and destroys livelihoods, lands, livestock, markets, and critical infrastructure, including for food storage and water access. Landmines and unexploded ordnance are another war legacy; they not only reduce potential food and export crop production, but further threaten security and peace.
Oxfam’s new briefing paper, “Food Wars: Conflict, Hunger, and Globalization, 2022-2023,” looks at 54 countries and territories with active conflicts, refugee populations, or a legacy of conflict in 2023. These 54 nations were home to 278 million people facing “crisis-level” acute food insecurity—that is, at Phase 3 or higher according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), accounting for 99% of the global crisis-level hunger population in 2023 (282 million people).
In all 54 countries, conflict was a major cause of hunger, although in some, extreme weather or economic shocks may have contributed substantially. With a few exceptions, IPC data are not sex-disaggregated. So, regrettably, we cannot measure the impact of the conflict-hunger connection through a gender lens, although we know that women, girls, and other vulnerable populations are disproportionately harmed in conflict situations.
It’s undeniable that conflict causes catastrophic food insecurity. For years, reports from UN agencies and many other sources have pointed to these links.
What is less frequently studied is the fact that war-displacement-hunger crises occur in countries that continue to rely heavily on primary product exports—gold and livestock products in Sudan, petroleum in South Sudan, coffee in Burundi, and grain and oilseeds in Ukraine, where Russia has weaponized food and agriculture.
Oxfam’s new report notes that in 26 of the 54 countries, the share of international trade in the respective country’s overall economy is higher than the global average. An even larger number of the countries (34 of 54) rely mainly on primary product exports, such as food, agriculture, and extractive industry products, or light assembly and low-end manufactures.
Paradoxically, international financial institutions and many aid donors often assume that economic liberalization and attracting foreign investment offer the best or only pathway to lasting peace. However, warring parties often struggle for control over primary commodity profits that can fund more violence. In addition, pushing for de-regulation of land and product markets without first establishing inclusive governance can worsen inequality, put low- and middle-income countries that are emerging from conflict into a dependent position in the global economy, and create the potential for renewed conflict.
Cultivation of export crops in and of itself isn’t the problem. In fact, these commodities are often important sources of revenue for small-scale farmers and governments in conflict-affected, food-insecure countries. So it’s crucial to understand the conflict implications of export- and food-crop value chains as part of food-wars policy discussions and actions.
The vital questions are how high-value crops are produced, who benefits, and what the relevant food and financial policies look like; these determine the effects on local households and whether there is violence. Large-scale private investment—whether foreign or domestic in origin—adds to political and economic instabilities where investors seize control over land and water and displace local people. Careful vetting and regulation of markets for high-value primary commodities can go a long way toward ensuring peaceful outcomes, especially when policies hold private-sector actors accountable for not aiding violence.
Some new international production and marketing agreements might improve livelihoods and revenue streams. The Abidjan Agreement on cocoa between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, for example, attempts to regulate cocoa markets and prices for producers, processors, and marketers, and also tries to mitigate the environmental destruction and hunger associated with cocoa production. By promoting price stability, the agreement has the potential to de-link export commodity production and conflict, a fatal legacy experienced in Côte d’Ivoire (where armed actors used cocoa profits to fund conflict).
Global policy makers increasingly emphasize the importance of breaking down the silos separating humanitarian assistance, development, and peacebuilding as a means of achieving lasting peace and promoting sustainable development. An initiative in Colombia seeks to put this “triple nexus” approach into practice. It links cocoa production to peacebuilding, sustainable livelihoods, environmental restoration, and gender justice. Scaling efforts along these lines offers promise.
Solutions must also focus on more holistic national development strategies, including food-systems approaches that protect and promote the human right to food, as well as frameworks that more effectively consider conflict, globalization, and climate change in food and nutrition policy. Support for peace transitions must address the livelihood needs of both long-suffering communities and returning refugees, so they can, in time, become food self-reliant. This has the potential to end cycles of grievance that fuel violent conflict, while promoting food security and a global economy that works for everyone, not just the richest 1%.